
The Delta General

Camp Website: www.humphreys1625.com



November - 2019, Volume 22, Issue 10
Dedicated to the memory of Brig. General Benjamin G. Humphreys

The Belta General

Camp Website: www.humphreys1625.com

Commander's Report: Larry McCluney

My Fellow Compatriots,

I hope everyone is doing well. Football season is upon us and there is a tendency to want to miss Camp activities. We did not have a meeting in October, but instead the Camp chose to set up a recruiting booth at the Carrollton Fall Pioneer and Pilgrimage Day. We have done this several times in the past but the past couple of years have not. The event yielded \$133.00 in donations to the Camp, and hopefully two potential members that were interested.

Dues renewals were due August 31. If you have not

paid, late fees have now been activated. The last time I checked, we lacked 2 members to renew to be at 100%. It is never too late to reactivate your membership.

I want to thank Dan and Ann McCaskill, as well as Annette McCluney for helping with the recruiting booth at Carrollton. We will meet on November 2nd for the next Camp meeting. Please bring a friend. We miss all of our brothers and sisters of the Camp so please try to make an effort to renew old friendships with us and bring a friend to our next Camp meeting.



In lieu of a regular Camp Meeting, the membership voted at our September Camp Meeting to set-up a recruiting table at the Carrollton Pioneer Days on October 5th. Larry put out the word for anyone wishing to help to be in Carrollton at 8:00 am to help set-up. Larry, Ann and I were the only ones there at 8 and Annette arrived about 9. Joe and Gabriel Nokes were taking part in the living history which started on Friday at the J. Z. George's plantation.

The weather was very nice although a little warm. We visited with many people and made contact with some old friends. We did have three promising prospects for membership in the Camp. Only time will tell. One thing we did was sale Flags and accept donations for Heritage Defense. At the end of the day, we raised \$ 134. In the end, it was a good day. Adjutant wise, since our last Camp Meeting, a couple of delinquent members have renewed their membership which brings the Camp to 43 which is a growth of one despite losing two members. This is the closest the Camp has ever come to attaining 100% renewal. Maybe next year. The only expense for the Camp has been the purchase of stamps. Our account balance stands at \$ 1,409. 56 which includes monies raised at Carrollton. One thing to keep in mind, December we will be electing new Camp Officers. Currently, we do not have anyone seeking the position of Commander, 1st Lt. Commander or 2nd Lt. Commander. If those positions are not filled, we may not be able to function as a Camp.

My Confederate Ancestor: Larry McCluney

Pvt. James W. McClunev

Our Camp Commander's ancestor was Pvt. James Wesley McCluney who enlisted originally on September 6, 1862 in Okolona, MS in Company F, 3rd Battalion Mississippi (Minutemen) State

Troops under Captain W.S. Harrington.

The battalion was enlisted for an indefinite period, picked men from the militia companies in the various counties, for defense of the State, under orders of the Confederate army officers, and went into camp at Okolona in September, 1862. The field officers were elected September 25. Early in October they were ordered to Columbus. Gen. John Adams, commanding the Fourth District, reported January 5, 1863, Third Battalion, aggregate, 399. "They were sent to Vicksburg by order of General Pemberton November 28, 1862, and are now there in the actual service of the Confederate States. These troops never were mustered into the service of the Confederate States, but have been and still are performing guard and other duties at this post. The State troops are styled by the Governor Minute Men, have arrived at a certain degree of proficiency and will compare favorably with Confederate States troops of the same length of service." Colonel Burgin, who left Columbus in command of the battalion, was stationed at Snyder's Bluff, in command of a brigade. This battalion was the only organization of State troops listed in Gen. M.L. Smith's statement of January, 1863.

Captain Jeptha V, Harris, of the battalion, was promoted as Brigadier-General, commanding Minute Men at Columbus, September 2, 1862. M. P. Jones was his Adjutant. January 19, Gen. Ruggles, commanding at Columbus, ordered Brig.-Gen. Harris, commanding State troops, to remove his brigade, consisting of Fifth Regiment and Third Battalion, to a suitable position about one and one half miles north of this post on the Aberdeen road. Return of Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. V. Harris, for February, 1863, Third Battalion. 246 present, 413 aggregate, stationed at

At the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou, this unit was attached to Col. Allen Thomas' Provisional Brigade, of Brig. Gen. Stephen Dill Lee's Provisional Division, Maj. Gen. Martin Luther Smith's 2d





Brig. General Benjamin G. Humphreys Camp #1625, SCV

Contents

1. Camp News - pp. 2-4, 20

- Commander's Note
- Adjutant's Report
- Chaplain's Pen
- New Book Announcement
- Welcome New Member
 - Renewal Notice

2. Division News - pp. 4-6

- News from Beauvior
- Bricks for Beauvior
 - **Prayer Request**
 - Fall Muster
- Defending Our Heritage
 - Bricks for Beauvior

3. National News - pp. 6-14

- Make Dixie Great Again
- Save General Forrest

Reunion in Jacksonville, FL

4. Articles - pp. 13-19

- The War For Southern Independence
 - A Classic Ballard
- General John Hunt Morgan
 - Kids' Page

Camp Commander

Larry McCluney confederate@suddenlink.net

Larry McCluney - (662) 453-7212 confederate@suddenlink.net

The Delta General is published 12 times a year by the Brig/ Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys Camp #1625, SCV, as a service to its members. The articles, photographs, or content of The Delta General may not be reproduced without the consent of the editor. The opinions expressed by the authors of signed articles reflect the personal views of the writers and are not necessarily the views of the Brig/Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys Camp #1625, SCV. The Delta General reserves the right to accept or reject content. Military District, of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton's Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas A.

Burgin.

15 April to 8 May 1863, the battalion was attached to Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers' 5th Military District (headquartered at Panola, MS), Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Department of the West. During the assaults and siege of Vicksburg, the battalion was attached to Brig. Gen. Jeptha V. Harris' Mississippi State Troops, of Brig. Gen. John C. Vaughn's 2d Brigade, Maj. Gen. Martin Luther Smith's Division, in Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton's Army of Vicksburg.

After the fall of Vicksburg, James McCluney was paroled at Vicksburg on July 10, 1863 and mustered out of service in Columbus, MS on September 4, 1863. Immediately after his mustering out, he mustered with Co. F, 6th Mississippi Cavalry organized in Houston, Missis-

sippi.

In October, 1863, Colonel Isham Harrison was forming his regiment at Columbus, according to report of Col. Richardson, commanding district. Colonel Harrison was ordered to report to General Ruggles at Co-

lumbus, February 11, 1864, his regiment to be armed there.

On February 23, 1864, Colonel Harrison, now commanding the cavalry brigade in the Columbus district, was directed to send his 6th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes' detachment, Colonel Morton's Battalion and Haller's section of Rice's Artillery to Cotton Gin port for defense of the Tombigbee. February 24, General Lee asked that the regiment be sent to Artesia to await his orders.

The 6th Cavalry Regiment, along with the 4th Cavalry, 14th Confederate, and 38th Mounted Infantry (about 1,000 men in all) was then assigned to Mabry's Brigade. Upon the approach of the third Federal expedition, Mabry's Brigade moved from Saltillo to Ellistown on July 9, 1864 and reported to General Bufford, of CSA Gen.Forrest's Cavalry. CSA Colonel Harrison was sent with the Sixth Cavalry Regiment to Plentytude, to operate on the flank of U.S. Gen. A. J. Smith's troops, moving to Pontotoc, and they skirmished on July 11th, 1864.

On July 13th, Mabry's Brigade, accompanied by CSA Generals Lee and Forrest, followed the enemy toward Tupelo, skirmishing sharply. U.S. Gen. Smith went into line of battle at Harrisburg, and Confederate Generals Lee and Forrest attacked him on July 14, 1864. In this action, Mabry's Brigade advanced under a furious fire of artillery. Mabry reported: "My line advanced steadily, driving a heavy line of skirmishers back to the fortifications. A most terrific fire of small arms was opened on me when we were within about 300 yards of the works. I immedi-

ately ordered a charge, but the heat was so intense and the distance so great that some officers and men fell exhausted and fainting along my line, while the fire from the enemy's line of works by both artillery and small arms was so heavy and well directed that many were killed and wounded. These two causes of depletion left my line almost like a line of skirmishers. At about sixty yards from the enemy's works, seeing that my line was too much weakened to drive the enemy, I halted and directed the men to protect themselves by lying down in a hollow and behind a low fence. I held this position until our second line came up to within about 100 yards of my rear and was repulsed, when I gave the order to fall back. My loss in the hollow and in falling back was severe."

U.S. Colonel Heath, Thirty-third Missouri (Union), reported that after the repulse of the last assault, Captain McKee's company, deployed to fill a gap in the line, "came upon a party of the enemy (confederate) sharpshooters, whom he charged and drove frown cover," capturing a flag "supposed to belong to the Sixth Mississippi," which the party was "endeavoring to recover from the hands of

their dead color bearer."

The total casualties of the 6th Mississippi Cavalry Regiment were 13 killed, 46 wounded, and 14 missing. Among the killed were Col. Isham Harrison, Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Nelson, Capt. T. G. Fields, and Lieuts. W. D. Carrington, Company H; and A. D. Clifton, Company C. Among the wounded, Lieut. J. F. Clifton, Company B; Sergt. W. J. Sweeney, D; Lieut. J. Turner, E; Capt. A. C. Johnson, Lieut. William Bell, I; Lieut. T. W. Cobb, A.

Total Confederate killed and wounded in the battle were: 1,262; total Federal killed and wounded: 636.

After the battle, CSA Gen. Bedford Forrest wrote, "The battle of Harrisburg will furnish the historian a bloody record, but it will also stamp with immortality the gallant dead and the living heroes it has made. Prominent among the dead the names of Col.. Isham Harrison and Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Nelson, of the Sixth Mississippi; Lieut.-Col. John B. Cage, commanding Fourteenth Confederate, Lieut.-Col. Sherrill, of the Seventh Kentucky, and Major Robert C. McCay, of the Thirty-eighth Mississippi, will shine in fadeless splendor. They were lion-hearted officers and courteous men. It was a sad blow that struck down these gallant spirits. In unselfish devotion to the cause and high courage they leave no superiors behind among men. Their noble natures and ardent patriotism, it is hoped, will find in the soldier's grave that peace for which their country has thus far struggled in vain, and for the achievement of which they have sacrificed their lives. Future generations will never weary in hanging garlands upon their graves." (Report of General Forrest.)

On Áugust 1, 1864, the brigade reported 400 present for duty. Captain Lipscomb was promoted as Lieutenant-Colonel, command-

ing the 6th Cavalry Regiment, which was returned to CSA Gen. Wirt Adams' district.

Colonel Lipscomb was at Macon with about 250 of Mabry's Brigade, when Grierson's raiders, from Memphis, struck the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in December, 1864. Grierson eluded most of the Confederate commands, and Lipscomb, in his pursuit, did not come up with him.

In February, 1865, with Mabry's Brigade, Wirt Adams' Cavalry, between Vicksburg and Jackson. On March 3, General Forrest ordered Mabry's Brigade broken up and assigned the 6th Cavalry Regiment to CSA Brig. Gen. Starke's Brigade Starke's brigade arrived at Selma, Ala., during the battle of April 2, but was unable to render assistance. Thence they fell back to Livingston, Ala., their post, April 30, 1865. The Sixth was consolidated with the Eighth Regiment, Colonel Duff, but under Col. R. G. Brown, retained its identity to the last.

The dates of capitulation were: By General Taylor, commanding department, May 4, 1865; by General Forrest, at Gainesville, Ala., May 22, 1865.



McCluney—continued from page 2 . . .

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From the Chaplain's pen September ... Earl McCown

November 2019

To pick up where I left off last month.....


Stonewall Jackson was convinced of the need to strengthen the faith of his soldiers, because he insisted that his "...gallant little army...be an army of the living God as well as of its country." However, this ability of Southern soldiers to look to their pious superiors as role models sometimes contained hidden dangers. Some Confederates came to believe that "We have depended too much on General Lee, and too little on God."

During the course of the War, many Confederates looked on their generals, Lee in particular, as their saviors in the various military crises that arose during the course of the War. This is one of the meanings inherent in the preceding quotation. However, seeing Lee and Jackson as models of the faith, Confederate soldiers and civilians alike, could be tempted to place them on a level with Christ, thus turning their earthly leaders into

Many Confederate letters and diaries reveal a conflicting desire to see Southern generals as instruments of God's will upon earth, and yet as agents in themselves, who would through their own merits achieve the Confederacy's salvation. The first interpretation of the general's role was theologically sound, while the latter was heretical and ultimately idolatrous, and many Southerners realized the danger. As time passed and the Confederacy's plight grew more and more desperate, some Confederates drew encouragement from the generals' piety. They also became more inclined to put their trust in God alone. By strengthening the faith of their soldiers, Confederate generals helped them to under-


stand that military might alone would not suffice to repel the Northern invaders. Both generals and their soldiers needed a strong and persevering faith to withstand the mounting evidence that their country was doomed.

To be continued.....



Bricks for Beauvoir and the Tomb of the Unknown Solider

Honor your confederate Ancestors by purchasing an Ancestral Memorial Brick for \$50.00 each in the Memorial sidewalk of the Confederate Cemetery at Beauvoir. The plans for the sidewalk are nearing completion, so if you want a brick put down for your ancestor you need to get your order in soon, so as not to miss out.



Each brick that you purchase will be engraved with your ancestors rank, name, unit and company. Memorial bricks will be laid, memorializing your ancestor, in a sidewalk from the UDC Arch to the Tomb of the Unknown Confederate Solider at Beauvoir.

Detach and send in the form below to the address listed to order your bricks.

Ancestral Brick Order Form

Instructions: Use the lines as laid out no more than 15 spaces per line.. You may use abbreviations when necessary. Please include your name and address, for confirmation letter. (See Sample Below)

Line 1:		
	(First and Last Name)	
Line 2:		
	(Rank	
Line 3:		
	Marks.	

ORDER YOUR ANCESTOR'S BRICKTODAY!

Make Checks out for \$50,00 per brick to:

Bricks for Beauwoir

Mail to: Bricks for Beauvoir

2244 Beach Blvd

Blicki, MS, 39531

Visit our gift shop where you 4000

can pay by cash or credit!

Example:

Pvt. JAMES W. McCluney

6th MS CAV, CO. F

Mississippi Division News

BEAUVIOR

Beauvoir, the historic post-war home of President Jefferson Davis, is owned and operated by the Mississippi Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. There are several ways that you can participate in the continued preservation of this beloved landmark located in Biloxi, Mississippi. Friends of Beauvior For as little as \$25 annually, you can become a member of the Friends of Beauvior. Membership includes tour admission and a 10% discount at the Beauvior gift shop. Bricks for Beauvior Honor your Confederate ancestors while supporting Beauvior. Each brick that you purchase will be engraved with your ancestors rank, name, unit, and company. The memorial bricks will be laid creating a sidewalk from the UDC Arch to the Tomb of the Unknown Confederate soldier.

For more information on these opportunities, please visit www.visitbeauvior.org or contact Beauvior directly at (228) 388-4400 Sponsorships Needed Beauvior is looking for sponsors for their annual car show at Coastfest on July 6, 2019. You can sponsor a first, second, or third place trophy for \$60.00 or sponsor and entire class for \$180.00. Your company name will be on the plaque for each trophy. For more information on sponsoring a trophy, please contact Kitsaa Stevens, Development and Programs, Beauvior Jefferson Davis Home - (228) 388 -4400 x217 or email Hilda Hellwig at hhellwig@beauvior.org

- DATES TO REMEMBER:
- February 2020... Pilgrimage to the Unknown Soldier Banquet on the 14th Pilgrimage on the 15th
- March 7, 2020 Confederate Flag Day
- March 14, 2020 BBQ a Music
- April 11, 2020 Easter Egg Hunt
- April 25, 2020 Confederate Memorial Day
- June 6,2020 Jefferson Davis Birthday(hoping to have a Period Ball as well)
- July 11,2020 Coastfest
- September 12, 2020 Bridal EXPO
- October 17-18, 2020 Fall Muster

We are trying to keep our calendar full of things to do and hope to bring more guest to our property throughout the year. If anyone has any questions, please feel free to call Kitsaa Stevens, Development & Programs, Beauvoir Jefferson Davis Home 228/388.4400 ext 217

Mansion Need Paint

Beauvoir will be painting the exterior of the mansion in the next few months and we are in need of people to donate paint Send donations to Beauvoir, Contact me for the colors. White and Green are the two colors needed but I will have to give them the color codes. The paint will have to be highest quality no Walmart specials. E-mail me at jessiesanford101@comcast.net or message me on FB.

Jessie Sanford

Laying of the Wreaths

Requesting volunteers to place wreaths on the veteran's graves in the Beauvoir Memorial Cemetery. All volunteers need to check into the gift shop at 1:30 pm and proceed to the cemetery by 2:00 pm. There will be a simple ceremony and then we will place wreaths on the graves. This dedication takes approximately an hour.

Mississippi Mechanized Cavalry News

Gentlemen,

Per Captain Nelms, the following is the schedule and information for our State Meeting in November: Officers Meeting Friday night November 8, 2019 at <u>Tpm sharp</u>, at the Quality Inn,14727 HWY. 15 Louisville Ms 39339 (662-773-9090). Our State meeting will be held Saturday November 9, 2019 at Lake Tiak O'Khata, 1290 Smyth Lake Rd., Louisville Ms 39339. <u>Arrive at 10</u> and lunch will be provided at 12 noon. Meeting will follow the meal.

National SCV News:

SCV Heritage Defense Fund

Dear Members,

As Judge Advocate-in-Chief, I ask every capable member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans to contribute to the Heritage Operations Fund of the SCV. I thank everyone who has contributed to Heritage Operations in the past. The accomplishments thus far have resulted from your efforts and attention to the need to fund our legal efforts.

Presently, the longstanding lawsuits in Charlottesville and Memphis carry on. The Virginia Division SCV has had great success in enforcement of Virginia's Memorials for War Veterans Act. This lawsuit has ensured that the Lee and Jackson Monuments in Charlottesville are fully displayed today. Without you and other SCV members, Lee and Jackson would be covered in tarps or hidden from view in a warehouse. This statement is literally true. We continue this fight today. The Virginia Court has enforced the law, in that the Monuments Act has been upheld.

The lawsuits in Memphis continue, and at this stage Memphis Camp 215 is before the Tennessee Supreme Court in its hard-fought battle. Your brothers in Memphis work dutifully and diligently to avoid injustice. They need your help to continue to avoid loss of the historic and treasured Monuments of Forrest and Davis.


Texas SCV Compatriots have valiantly fought lawsuits in Dallas, San Antonio, and Austin, Texas. The costs of these lawsuits continue. The Texas Division will be before the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on October 8, 2019. Our attorneys will present well founded and beautifully crafted arguments for preservation of your ancestors' memorials. The consolidated cases will likely be headed to the U.S. Supreme Court, with your funding assistance.

North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Tennessee Divisions have other proceedings at various stages in the process. Do not think that SCV efforts have waned. You, as an SCV member, are in the forefront of the fight against the American Taliban and Domestic ISIS. Together, we stand strong against history terrorists.

Checks may be made payable to the SCV Heritage Operations Fund, P.O. Box 59, Columbia, TN 38402. Please send your contributions now. Contribution may be made online at: https://scv.org/paypal-donations/

The Delta General, Volume XXII, November, Issue 10

page 6





~ Sons of Confederate Veterans 2020 Reunion ~

Official Registration Form (Page 1 of 2) Florida * July 15 ~ 18, 2020 Kirby-Smith Camp 1209, SCV www.scv2020reunion.com

NAME (Print):	
SCV CAMP NAME & NUMBER:	
TITLE/POSITION:	
PERSONAL ADDRESS:	
	Zip:
PHONE: ()	CELL: ()

EMAIL ADDRESS:

~ Tickets Purchased ~			
Event / Date	Price \$	Quantity	\$
Registration (Registration @ 2020 Reunion = \$60) (Received After 2020 Reunion Until July 1, 2019 = \$70)	60		
2020SCV Reunion Sponsored Events			
S.C.V. Heritage Luncheon Thursday, July 16, 2020 @ 12:30 P.M.	45		
S.C.V. Reunion Sponsored St. Augustine Guided Trolley Tour Thursday, July 1,2020 @ 2:00 P.M.	65		
Chaplain Breakfast Friday, July 11 ,2019 @ 7:00 A.M	35		
SCV Awards Luncheon F Friday, July 17, 2020 @ 12:00 P.M.	45		
St. Augustine Confederate Historical Locations Guided Tour Friday, July 17, 2020 @ 2:00 P.M.	60		
SCV Mechanized Cavalry Breakfast Saturday, July 18, 2020 @ 7:00 P.M.	35		
St. Augustine Lighthouse and Maritime Museum Tour Saturday, July 18, 2019 @ 2:00 P.M.	65		
SCV Banquet & Grand Ball NOTE: Minimal Dress/Attire is Coat & Tie or Period Uniform Saturday, July 18, 2020 @ 7:00 P.M Must Check: Chicken or Pork	75		
Ancestor Memorial ~ Each@2 Lines per Memorial (See below)	10		
Limited Edition Number 125th Reunion Medal and Presentation Box	75		

Subtotal -->>

REGISTRATION INCLUDES BADGE, REUNION MEDAL AND PROGRAM \sim ADDTITIONAL BADGES AND PROGRAMS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE AT CONVENTION CHECK IN

SCV 2020 NATIONAL REUNION VENUE



Welcome to the Renaissance Resort Home to the 2020 125th Sons of Confederate Veterans National Reunion

Located at the World Golf Village, 500 Legacy Park, St. Augustine Florida, 32092. The connected Convention center will provide all of our needs to have an amazing reunion. Truly a 1st class resort that will provide an amazing time. St. Augustine is just 15 miles away and the amenities are amazing. To book your room, call the reservations number at (800) 468-3571.

Please use the group call in code: SCVSCVA


The rate is \$149 a night for a standard room. Parking at the hotel is FREE.



Balcony View

THE ACCOMMODATIONS AT THE RESORT ARE QUITE AMAZING AND SHOULD PROVIDE AN AMAZING STAY AND OVERALL REUNION. THE OVERALL INTAKE WAS IMMACULATE AND WAS VERY FRIENDLY TO US IN EVERY WAY. THE SURROUNDING RETAIL STORES, MOVIE THEATER, RESTAURANTS AND MANY OTHER AMENITIES ARE WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE.

Inside, the Guest rooms are amazing and the bathrooms just the same. Truly 1st class and we hope you enjoy your stay!





~ Sons of Confederate Veterans 2019 Reunion ~

Florida * July 15 ~ 18, 2020 Kirby-Smith Camp 1209, SCV

Fill in Ancestor(s) Name & Unit (Each - Two Lines of 45 Characters ~ Use Back of Form if Necessary)

Sub Total ~ Price of Tickets & Memorials Page 1

Reunion Program Inclusions/Advertising Option Rates

FULL PAGE \$160.00 HALF PAGE \$90.00 QUARTER PAGE \$ 50.00

<u>Final Total</u> ~ Price of Tickets, Memorials and Program Options/Advertising

~ MAKE CHECKS PAYBLE TO ~

~ SCV 2020 REUNION ~

~ MAIL BOTH PAGES & PAYMENT TO ~

SCV 2020 REUNION 4884 Victoria Chase Ct. Jacksonville, FL 32257



Host Hotel: World Golf Village Renaissance St. Augustine Resort
500 S Legacy Trail
St. Augustine, FL 32092 Reservation Desk: 1-800-468-3571
Call in Code: SCVSCVA

Circle selected Inclusions/Advertising Option on the Form Above, Include Payment, and Attach Information to be placed in the Reunion Program. Orders and Information for Ancestor Memorial & Inclusions/Advertising Options must be received by May 1. 2020 at the

Victoria Chase Ct. STREET MAIL ADDRESS above to be Included in Reunion Program.



"Sirs, you have no reason to be ashamed of your Confederate dead; see to it they have no reason to be ashamed of you." Robert Lewis Dabney Chaplain for Stonewall Jackson

125th Annual National Reunion of the Sons of Confederate Veterans

2020 Reunion Held in Florida

Ancestor Memorial (Recognition in the Kirby-Smith Section 2020 Reunion Program)

\$10.00 each

Your name and your ancestor's name and unit will be printed in the Kirby-Smith Memorial section of the 2020 SCV Reunion Program

1.	Ancestor's Name:		Rank:
	Ancestor's Unit:		
		\$10.00 each	
2. And	Ancestor's Name:		Rank:
	Ancestor's Unit:		
	Ancestors Registration Quantity _	x \$10.00 = \$	
	Make Check payable to: Kirby-S	Smith Camp #1209 2	2020 Reunion

Mail to: Calvin Hart, 4884 Victoria Chase Ct Jacksonville, FL 32257

Candidacy Announcements For Lt. CiC—Jason Boshers

Compatriots,

On November 27 1863, a young man, a Confederate Soldier, stood on the gallows in Pulaski Tennessee. All this young man had to do was say what they wanted him to say. have done this; he would have betrayed his cause, his family and his fellow Confederates. His hands were tied behind his back. His feet were tied together. The noose was hanging in front of him. He shook his head "No". According to the story, he then turned the hangman and said, "I have done my duty. Now do yours". That young man was Sam

Oh, to have just a touch of that bravery and that sense of duty.

It is no secret and everyone knows the challenges we face today. The assault is relentless and without thought or reasoning. What is just, right and Christian has been thrown out the window. Not just Confederate History but ALL History; has faced this onslaught.

We have endured and we have fought back. Yes, we have suffered losses. Yes, hard

fought victories have been won. Yes, we have been fighting back and we will continue to fight and fight we must on all fronts. From the cam-

paigns we are currently involved, to the campaigns forthcoming.

We have been given the most wonderful inheritance of being descendants of Confederate soldiers. "The Charge" from Stephen D. Lee tells us our marching orders. When I joined this brotherhood in 2004, I took a vow to defend and honor. It is with a sense of duty that I desire to run for the job of Lt. Commander-in-Chief.

I have had the honor to serve as Army of Tennessee Councilman and Army of Tennessee Commander. I have traveled hither and yon in support of my brothers. I am very aware that our enemies are many, and that they will use any and all tactics necessary. I will not shy away from my duties and this fight.

Today we stand in the stead that our ancestors did all those year ago, and we must defend their honor. It will not be an easy fight, but it is necessary and honorable. I appreciate your support, and may we step forward together to do our duty.

Respectfully and sincerely yours in the fight for our cause, Robert Samuel Jason Boshers

For AoT Commander—Jimmy Hill

In April 1906, Stephen D. Lee gave us the Charge. As the country continued to heal from the war, we faced many of the same challenges we face today, primarily the truth about the war and educating our children about the reasons our soldiers fought. However, we had the support of the people in the South and the politicians. It was nothing uncommon for 10,000 or more to attend a reunion including Congressmen, Senators and Presidents. For the last 25 years we have faced the same challenges on getting the truth of why we fought to the general public. The education of our children has further eroded. The attitudes of the people and politicians have changed. A concerted effort to remove everything Confederate has gained momentum.

As an organization we have to shift gears. We can keep the traditions of the SCV alive but the tactics that we have to undertake to combat our detractors have to change. As Commander in Chief Gramling has stated, "We have to take back the narrative". As your AoT Councilman, my position has allowed me to work on member issues. We held a very successful AoT workshop in Birmingham, focusing on Sales Force, the Southern Victory Campaign, Fundraising and other relevant topics. We have at least one more planned for early 2020. We supported Division and National events. We have a new museum opening next year in the heart of the AoT. It will be the latest opportunity to tell our story, the truth about why our people fought and how they endured after the war. It didn't end in 1865

I am standing for the office of AoT Commander. My goal is to continue what we have started but to also look for ways to improve. We have to improve communications to our membership. We need everyone engaged. We have to improve public relations utilizing social media and other platforms to get our message out. It may require hiring a Public Relations firm or a Consultant that is trained specifically in that area. We have to become more involved in our communities and we have to build our camps.

I believe in the SCV and what we stand for. I believe the general public has seen that our detractors also are attempting to rewrite the history all the way back to our founders. As an organization we are at a crossroads and we have an opportunity. I am asking for your vote in Jacksonville and if elected I am asking for your help and your support. Feel free to contact me with your thoughts and concerns. I am here to listen.

Jimmy Hill, AoT Councilman

Candidacy Announcement for Commander-in-Chief

My Fellow Compatriots,

We are in the middle of a WAR, a war against "Political Correctness" and the preservation of not only OUR history but AMERICAN HISTORY as well. All around our Confederation attacks are taking place to eradicate the truth about the TRUE CAUSE our ancestors fought and died for during that bloody struggle. We must recruit and educate the next generations as new members our organization, educate the general public about the true Cause our ancestors fought for, and promote our organization in our communities if we are going to carry out our mission.

To accomplish this, we need the proper leadership to see this carried out a gentlemanly and orderly fashion. To meet this challenge we need men who can bring new innovative ideas to the table, and who are willing to work hard bringing our membership together under a common Cause, and to meet the demands that the "Charge of Gen. Stephen D. Lee" has laid before us. Our 'enemies" have been reeling in recent days and attacks upon our monuments are not so frequent, but those days will not last long as the political climate

becomes more hostile as we approach a new presidential election in 2020. We are the "low hanging fruit" and have become the focal point of attack upon everything that is truly "American". As this political climate becomes more volatile, our enemies will renew their attacks soon and once again paint a picture that the Cause our ancestors fought for was immoral, illegal, and unjust.

Our organization is the largest and most recognizable organization for the promotion of Confederate Heritage, and it is time we capitalize on that fact. We must hold true to Stephen D. Lee's Charge to us and make our organization something that will be perpetuated for future generations so that they too may take pride and celebrate a rich Confederate heritage that we have inherited. To make this happen, there is serious work before us that needs to be done in an aggressive and imaginative manner, emulating the principles that of our ancestors.

It is time to look at our problems with new eyes, keeping in place the wisdom gleaned from the lessons of the past. We need to use 21st Century ideas to fight this growing threat of "political correctness." As a high school and college teacher for twenty-six years, it has been my



Τo

to

job to teach students our nation's history. I have seen political correctness infiltrating our history books and it has been a struggle to teach the "truth" in our classrooms. Yet, the youth of today are eager to know the truth when it is presented. As a Southerner and a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, it is my duty to teach the truth about the Cause our ancestors fought for and to uphold the "Charge" they have left for us. This, I am faithfully carrying out.

As your current Lt. Commander-in-Chief, I have proven that I have the energy, the experience, and the right attitude to lead and represent the interests of this Organization. Thus, I humbly ask for your support and elect me as YOUR Commander-in-chief in 2020 in Jackson-ville, Florida so that I may continue the mission of carrying out the Charge of General Stephen Dill Lee. To learn more about me please feel free to visit my website at:

mccluney4cic.homestead.com/McCluney2012.html

Larry A. McCluney, Jr. Lt. Commander-in-Chief,


Sons of Confederate Veterans

Contact information: Phone - 662-453-7212 confederate@suddenlink.net

1412 North Park Dr. Greenwood, MS 38930

Sons of Confederate Veterans

Help Save General Forrest



The Memphis City Council has passed a resolution to remove the Forrest Equestrian Statue from Forrest Park and to dig up the graves of General Forrest and his wife MaryAnn from beneath the statue.

The SCV and the Forrest family descendants must raise money to fight the city in this second attack on General Forrest. We need your help.

Help us to save the graves and monument of General Forrest

Can you, or your camp or Division donate \$100, \$500 or \$1000 to the defense?

		Zip:

Forrest Park Defense Fund

PO Box 241875. Memphis, TN 38124

The Nashville Campaign

The **Franklin–Nashville Campaign**, also known as **Hood's Tennessee Campaign**, was a series of battles in the Western Theater, conducted from September 18 to December 27, 1864,^[6] in Alabama, Tennessee, and northwestern Georgia during the American Civil

The Confederate Army of Tennessee under Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood drove north from Atlanta, threatening Mai, Gen, William T. Sherman's lines of communications and central Tennessee. After a brief attempt to pursue Hood, Sherman returned to Atlanta and began

his March to the Sea, leaving Union forces under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas to deal with Hood's threat.

Hood hoped to defeat the Union force under Maj. Gen. John Schofield before it could converge with Thomas's army and attempted to do so at the Battle of Spring Hill on November 29, but poorly coordinated Confederate attacks allowed Schofield to escape. The following day, Hood launched a series of futile frontal assaults against Schofield's field fortifications in the Battle of Franklin, suffering heavy casualties; Schofield withdrew his force and successfully linked up with Thomas in Nashville, Tennessee. On December 15-16, Thomas's combined army attacked Hood's depleted army and routed it in the Battle of Nashville, sending it in retreat to Tupelo, Mississippi. Hood resigned his commission shortly thereafter and the Army of Tennessee ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

At the conclusion of his successful Atlanta Campaign, Sherman occupied the city of Atlanta on September 2, 1864, and Hood, who was forced to evacuate the city, regrouped at Lovejoy's Station. For almost a month, the normally aggressive Sherman took little action while his men sat about idly, and many left the army at the end of their enlistments. On September 21, Hood moved his forces to Palmetto, Georgia, where on September 25, he was visited by Confederate President Jefferson Davis. The two men planned their strategy, which called for Hood to move toward Chattanooga, Tennessee, and operate against Sherman's lines of communications. They hoped that Sherman would follow and that Hood would be able to maneuver Sherman into a decisive battle on terrain favorable to the

During the conference, Davis expressed his disppointment in Hood's performance during the Atlanta Campaign, losing tens of thousands of men in ill-advised frontal assaults for no significant gains, and implied that he was considering replacing Hood in command of the army. After the president's departure for Montgomery, Alabama, he telegraphed Hood that he had decided to retain him in command and, acceding to Hood's request, transferred Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, one of Hood's corps commanders, out of the Army of Tennessee. He also established a new theater commander to supervise Hood and the department of Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor, although the officer selected for the assignment, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, was not expected to exert any real operational control of the armies in the field. [8]

Although Sherman was planning to march east to seize the city of Savannah, Georgia (the campaign that would be known as Sherman's March to the Sea) he was concerned about his lines of communications back to Chattanooga. One particular threat was the cavalry commander Nathan Bedford Forrest, who had long bedeviled Union expeditions with lightning raids into their rear areas. On September 29, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant urged Sherman to dispose of Forrest and Sherman sent Thomas to Nashville, Tennessee, to organize all of the troops in the state. Sherman sent another division, under Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan, to Chattanooga. [9]

Sherman had some advance notice of the nature of Hood's proposed campaign. In a series of speeches given at stops along his way back to Richmond, President Davis rallied his listeners by predicting success for Hood, speeches that were reported in the press and read

avidly by Sherman. In Columbia, South Carolina, his speech included:

General Hood's strategy has been good and his conduct has been gallant. His eye is now fixed upon a point far beyond that where he was assailed by the enemy. He hopes soon to have his hand upon Sherman's line of communications, and to fix it where he can hold it. ... I believe it is in the power of the men of the Confederacy to plant our banners on the banks of the Ohio, where we shall say to the Yankee, "be quiet or we shall teach you another lesson."^[10] Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood's^[11] Army of Tennessee, at 39,000 men, constituted the second-lar

Army of Tennessee, at 39,000 men, constituted the second-largest remaining army of the Confederacy, ranking in strength only after Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The army consisted of the corps of Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, and cavalry forces under Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. [12]

At the beginning of the campaign, Union forces designated the Military Division of the Mississippi were commanded by Sherman in Atlanta, but his personal involvement in the campaign lasted only until the end of October. Reporting to Sherman was the Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas (the "Rock of Chickamauga"), the force previously commanded by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans. Thomas was the principal Union commander after Sherman's departure. Subordinate to him was the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield. It consisted of 34,000 men, made up of the IV Corps under Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, the XXIII Corps under Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, and a Cavalry Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson. Thomas had an additional 26,000 men at Nashville and scattered around his department.^[13]

So far, the Confederate strategy was working, because Sherman was being forced to disperse his strength to maintain his lines of communications. However, Sherman was not about to fall into Hood's trap completely. He intended to provide Thomas with sufficient strength to cope with Forrest and Hood, while he completed plans to strike out for Savannah. On September 29, Hood began his advance across the Chattahoochee River, heading to the northwest with 40,000 men to threaten the Western & Atlantic Railroad, Sherman's supply line. On October 1, Hood's cavalry was intercepted by Union cavalry under Brig. Gens. Judson Kilpatrick and Kenner Garrard in a raid on the railroad near Marietta, but Sherman was still uncertain of Hood's location. For the next three weeks, Sherman had difficulty keeping abreast of Hood's movements. Hood moved rapidly, screened his march, and maintained the initiative. The Union cavalry, which

Sherman had neglected to train adequately, had a difficult time following Hood and reporting his movements. [14]

On October 3, the day that Thomas arrived in Nashville, Stewart's corps captured Big Shanty (present-day Kennesaw) with its garrison of 175 men, and the following day Acworth, with an additional 250. Sherman left Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum in Atlanta and moved toward Marietta with a force of about 55,000 men. Hood split his force, sending the majority of his command to Dallas,


Georgia. The remainder, a division under Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French, moved along the railroad toward Allatoona. [15]

The small Federal garrison at Allatoona, a partial brigade, was commanded by Col. John Tourtellotte. Before the Southern division arrived, Sherman sent a reinforcement brigade with Brig. Gen. John M. Corse, who took command of both brigades. The Federal troops occupied strong defensive positions in two earthen redoubts on each side of a 180-foot, 65 feet deep railroad cut and many of the men, including the entire 7th Illinois, were armed with Henry repeating rifles. [16]

French's division arrived near Allatoona at sunrise on October 5. After a two-hour artillery bombardment, French sent a demand for surrender, which Corse refused. French then launched his brigades in an attack—one from the north (against the rear of the fortifications) and two from the west. Corse's men survived the sustained two-hour attack against the main fortification, the Star Fort on the western side of the railroad cut, but were pinned down and Tourtellotte sent reinforcements from the eastern fort. Under heavy pressure, it seemed inevitable that the Federals would be forced to surrender, but by noon French received a false report from his cavalry that a strong Union force was approaching from Acworth , so he reluctantly withdrew at 2 p.m. Allatoona was a relatively small, but bloody battle with high percentages of casualties. [17]

Hood then moved to the west and crossed the Coosa River in the vicinity of Rome, Georgia, near the Alabama state line. He turned north in the direction of Resaca, Georgia, and joined with Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, which had been previously raiding in Tennessee. On October 12, Hood demanded the surrender of the Union brigade stationed at Resaca and left Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee's corps there to invest the city. The 700 Union men under Col. Clark R. Weaver refused Hood's ultimatum to surrender, which warned that no prisoners would be taken. Weaver replied "In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it." Hood declined to attack the Union position because he believed that it would be too costly, instead bypassing the city, moving north, and continuing the destruc-

tion of the railroad.[18]



Meanwhile, Sherman had learned of Hood's location and ordered reinforcements sent to Resaca, arriving there on October 13, too late to engage Hood in battle. Hood sent Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart as far north as Tunnel Hill, near the Tennessee state line, to damage the railroad as much as possible. During this operation, on October 13, Stewart captured the Federal garrison at Dalton, Georgia, under ugly circumstances. The 751 men under Col. Lewis Johnson included a large number of African-American soldiers, a sight that enraged many in Hood's armý. In surrender negotiations, John-son insisted that his black troops be treated as prisoners of war, but Hood replied that "all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy" would be returned to their masters. Unable to defend the garrison, Johnson surrendered and 600 black soldiers were stripped of their shoes and some clothing and marched to the rail-

road, where they were forced to tear up about 2 miles of track under the supervision of Maj. Gen. William B. Bate's division. Six of the Union soldiers were shot for refusing to work or being unable to keep up with the march. Col. Johnson later wrote that the abuse his men received "exceeded anything in brutality I have ever witnessed." Johnson and his white officers were paroled the following day, but some of his black soldiers were returned to slavery. [19]

The first command miscommunication of the battle took place upon Hood's arrival. Cheatham had ordered his division under Maj. Gen. William B. Bate to move against Spring Hill in concert with Cleburne, forming up on the Irishman's left. Hood then personally ordered Bate to move towards the Columbia Pike and "sweep toward Columbia." Neither Bate nor Hood bothered to inform Cheatham of this change in orders. At about 5:30 p.m., Bate's lead element of sharpshooters fired on a Federal column approaching from their left—Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger's division of the XXIII Corps, the vanguard of Schofield's main body. But before the two divisions could engage in

battle, an officer from Cheatham's staff arrived to insist that Bate follow Cheatham's original orders and join Cleburne's attack. Late that night, Bate reported the contact with the Federal column, but Cheatham discounted the importance of the encounter. [38]

From Resaca, Hood withdrew on a six-day march to the west toward Gadsden, Alabama, reaching it on October 20. He had hoped to engage Sherman in battle near LaFayette, Georgia, but his subordinate commanders convinced him that their troops' morale was not ready to risk an attack. He considered his campaign a success so far, having destroyed 24 miles of railroad, although this turned out to be a fleeting advantage to the South. Sherman deployed as many as 10,000 men in reconstruction and by October 28 regular rail service resumed

between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Sherman pursued Hood only as far as Gaylesville, Alabama, over 30 miles short of Gadsden.^[20]
Hood began to focus his strategy. He needed to prevent Thomas's army from reuniting with Sherman and overwhelming him, and he calculated that if he moved swiftly into Tennessee, he might be able to defeat Thomas before the Union forces could be reassembled. After Thomas was eliminated, Hood planned to move into central Kentucky and replenish his army with recruits from there and Tennessee. He hoped to accomplish all of this before Sherman could reach him. His plan was that if Sherman followed him, Hood would fight him in Kentucky; from there he planned to move eastward through the Cumberland Gap to aid Robert E. Lee, who was besieged at Petersburg. On October 21, Hood's plan received the reluctant approval of Gen. Beauregard, who was concerned about the daunting logistical challenges of an invasion. Beauregard insisted that Wheeler's cavalry be detached to monitor Sherman, and assigned Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry to Hood's advance. Hood set out toward Decatur, Alabama, with the intention of meeting up with Forrest in the vicinity of Florence, from where they would march north into Tennessee. [21]

By this time, Sherman had received an indication from Grant that he was favorably considering the march to Savannah. He set his mind on the short-term goal of pursuing the swiftly moving Hood. He directed Thomas to come forward from Nashville to block Hood's advance. To bolster Thomas's effort, Sherman ordered the IV Corps under Stanley to Chattanooga and the XXIII Corps under Schofield to Nashville, as well as Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith's XVI Corps from Missouri to Nashville. By November 10, the remainder of Sherman's troops were en route back to Atlanta. [22]

One of the critical Federal supply lines in Tennessee was to use the Tennessee River, offload supplies at Johnsonville, and then ship them by rail to Nashville. Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor ordered Maj. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest on a cavalry raid through Western Tennessee to destroy that supply line. The first of Forrest's men began to ride on October 16; Forrest himself began moving north on October 24 and reached Fort Heiman on the Tennessee River on October 28, where he emplaced artillery. On October 29 and October 30, his artillery fire caused the capture of three steamers and two gunboats. Forrest re-paired two of the

boats, *Undine* and *Venus*, to use as a small flotilla to aid in his attack on Johnsonville. On November 2, Forrest's flotilla was challenged by two

Union gunboats, Key

West and Tawah, and Venus was run aground and captured. The Federals dispatched six more gunboats from Paducah, Kentucky, and on November 3 they engaged in artillery duels with strong Confederate positions on either end of Reynoldsburg Island, near Johnsonville. The Federal fleet had difficulty attempting to subdue these positions and were occupied as Forrest prepared his force for the attack on Johnsonville. [23]


On the morning of November Undine and the Confederate batteries were attacked by three Union gunboats from Johnsonville and the six Paducah gunboats. *Undine* was abandoned and set on fire, which caused her ammunition magazine to explode, ending Forrest's brief career as a naval commander. Despite this loss, the Confederate land artillery was completely effective in neutralizing the threat of the Federal fleets. Forrest's guns bombarded the Union supply depot and the 28 steamboats and barges positioned at the wharf. All three of the Union gunboats were disabled or destroyed. The Union garrison commander ordered that the supply vessels be burned to prevent their capture by the Confederates.[24

Forrest had caused enormous damage at very low cost. He reported only 2 men killed and 9 wounded. He described the Union losses

as 4 gunboats, 14 transports, 20 barges, 26 pieces of artillery, \$6,700,000 worth of property, and 150 prisoners. One Union officer described the monetary loss as about \$2,200,000. Forrest's command, delayed by heavy rains, proceeded to Perryville, Tennessee, and eventually reached Corinth, Mississippi, on November 10. During the raid, on November 3, Beauregard designated Forrest's cavalry for assignment to Hood's Army of Tennessee. Hood elected to delay his advance from Florence to Tuscumbia until Forrest was able to link up with him on November 16.^[25]

Hood departed from Gadsden on October 22, en route to Guntersville, Alabama, where he planned to cross the Tennessee River. Learning that that crossing place was strongly guarded, and concerned that Federal gunboats could destroy any pontoon bridge he might deploy, he impulsively changed his destination to Decatur, 40 miles west. When Hood arrived at Decatur on October 26, he found that a Federal infantry force of 3–5,000 men was defending an entrenched line that included two forts and 1,600 yards of rifle pits. Two Federal wooden gunboats patrolled the river. On October 28, Confederate skirmishers advanced through a dense fog to a ravine within 800 yards of the main fortifications. Around noon, a small Federal detachment drove the sharpshooters and skirmishers out of the ravine, capturing 125 men. Hood, concluding that he could not afford the casualties that would ensue from a full-scale assault, withdrew his army. He decided once again to move to the west, to attempt another crossing near Tuscumbia, Alabama, where Muscle Shoals would prevent interference by Federal gunboats. [26]

Hood waited for Forrest at Tuscumbia for almost three weeks while his commissary officers attempted to provide 20 days supply of rations for the upcoming campaign. This was a difficult assignment because the supply line was tenuous, requiring transport on two railroads, followed by 15 miles on poor roads to Tuscumbia, using wagons pulled by undernourished horses and oxen. Hood transferred his headquarters to Florence on the morning of November 13 and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's corps marched across the river that day with the army's supply trains and cattle following on November 14. The final corps, under Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, crossed the Tennessee on November 20.^[27]



On November 16, Hood received word that Sherman was about to depart Atlanta for his March to the Sea. Beauregard urged Hood to take immediate action in an attempt to distract Sherman's advance, emphasizing the importance of moving before Thomas could consolidate his forces. Both Sherman and Thomas considered it likely that Hood would follow Sherman through Georgia. Although Thomas received intelligence that Hood was amassing supplies for a movement north, he discounted most of it—heavy rains during November made the roads almost impassable. By November 21, however, Thomas had evidence that all three of Hood's corps were in motion and he directed Schofield to withdraw gradually to the north to protect Columbia before Hood could seize it. Schofield arrived at Pulaski on the night of November 13 and assumed command of all forces there, including the IV Corps. Thomas remained concerned that 10,000 troops from the XVI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith, had not arrived as promised reinforcements from Missouri.^[28]

Hood's army departed Florence on November 21, marching in three columns, with Cheatham on the left, Lee in the center, and Stewart on the right, all screened by Forrest's cavalry. Hood's plan was to consolidate at Mount Pleasant and from there move to the east to cut off Schofield before he could reach Columbia and the Duck River. The rapid forced march 70 miles north was under miserable conditions, with freezing winds and sleet, which made progress difficult for the underfed and underclothed army. Nevertheless, Hood's men were in good spirits as they returned to Tennessee. [30]

Because of Forrest's relentless screening, Schofield had no idea where the Confederate Army was headed. The aggressive Forrest had a slight advantage over his Union cavalry opponents, commanded by Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson. Wilson had arrived from the Eastern Theater in late October to reorganize and command Thomas's cavalry, but he possessed only 4,800 horsemen ready to oppose Forrest, compared to Forrest's between 5,000 and 6,000 men. The Confederate cavalry advanced to Mount Pleasant by November 23. Brig. Gen. John T. Croxton's brigade, the initial Federal cavalry force, was reinforced with a division under Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch and a brigade under Col. Horace Capron. [31]

Forrest kept up the pressure and on November 23 heavy skirmishing occurred from Henryville to the outskirts of Mount Pleasant. To the east, Forrest's divisions under Brig. Gens. Abraham Buford and William H. Jackson forced Hatch's division out of the Lawrenceburg area and drove them back toward Pulaski. Early on November 24, Schofield began marching his two infantry corps north to Columbia. Forrest pursued aggressively with part of the division of Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers, who occupied Mount Pleasant and hit Capron's men repeatedly as he forced them north. Buford and Jackson drove Hatch north toward Lynnville and captured a number of prisoners, but the Confederate cavalry was unable to prevent the division of Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox from reaching Columbia. Stanley's corps completed a 30-mile march from Pulaski to reinforce him. Together they began constructing an arc of trenches just south of the town. [32]

On the morning of November 24, Forrest's cavalry began probing attacks in an attempt to break through two lines of fortifications. The

Confederates bombarded the lines with artillery and a number of skirmishes occurred, but it became apparent to the Union defenders that only a single infantry division with some dismounted cavalry were participating in the attacks and that Hood was merely demonstrating, intending to cross the Duck River either upstream or downstream and cut off the Union force from Thomas, who was assembling the remainder of his force in Nashville.^[33]

On the morning of November 26, Schofield received an order from Thomas to hold the north bank of the Duck River until reinforcements under A. J. Smith could arrive from Nashville. Schofield planned to move his trains during the day and his infantry overnight, using a railroad bridge and a recently installed pontoon bridge, but heavy rains that day made approaches to the bridge impassable. That evening, the bulk of the Army of Tennessee reached the fortifications south of Columbia. [34]

On November 28, Forrest crossed the river east of town against little resistance from the Union cavalry; the Southern cavalrymen had deceived Wilson and drawn his force to the northeast and away from the action. On the same day, Thomas directed Schofield to begin preparations for a withdrawal north to Franklin. He was expecting (incorrectly) that A. J. Smith's arrival from Missouri was imminent and he wanted the combined force to defend against Hood on the line of the Harpeth River at Franklin instead of the Duck River. Schofield sent his

800-wagon supply train out in front, guarded by part of the IV Corps division of Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner. [35]

On November 29 Hood sent Cheatham's and Stewart's corps on a flanking march north, crossing the Duck River at Davis's Ford east of Columbia while two divisions of Lee's corps and most of the army's artillery remained on the southern bank to deceive Schofield into thinking a general assault was planned against Columbia. Hood, riding near the head of the column with Cheatham's corps, planned to interpose his army between Schofield and Thomas, hoping to defeat Schofield as the Federals retreated north from Columbia. Stewart's corps followed Cheatham, and they were followed by the division of Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson (Lee's corps). The rest of Lee's corps remained south of Columbia, demonstrating with artillery fire against Schofield's men north of the Duck. [36]

Cavalry skirmishing between Wilson's and Forrest's troopers continued throughout the day. Forrest's wide turning movement with 4,000 troopers had forced Wilson north to Hurt's Corner, preventing the Union horsemen from interfering with Hood's infantry advance. By 10 a.m., Forrest ordered his men to turn west toward Spring Hill. Wilson sent multiple messages to Schofield warning of Hood's advance, but it was not until dawn on November 29 that Schofield believed the reports and realized the predicament he was in. He sent Stanley north with portions of the IV Corps to protect the trains, but also to hold the crossroads at Spring Hill to allow the entire army to withdraw safely to Franklin. Forrest's cavalrymen ran into pickets from the IV Corps; Stanley had moved north rapidly and formed up positions with Wagner's division that protected the village of Spring Hill on three sides. The brigade of Col. John Q. Lane rushed forward and pushed back the dismounted cavalrymen. Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne's division of Cheatham's corps arrived midafternoon on Forrest's left. The cavalrymen, low on ammunition, pulled out of the line and moved north to be ready to cover a further advance of Hood's army, or to block Schofield's withdrawal.[37]

The first command miscommunication of the battle took place upon Hood's arrival. Cheatham had ordered his division under Maj. Gen. William B. Bate to move against Spring Hill in concert with Cleburne, forming up on the Irishman's left. Hood then personally ordered Bate to move towards the Columbia Pike and "sweep toward Columbia." Neither Bate nor Hood bothered to inform Cheatham of this change in orders. At about 5:30 p.m., Bate's lead element of sharpshooters fired on a Federal column approaching from their left-Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger's division of the XXIII Corps, the vanguard of Schofield's main body. But before the two divisions could engage in battle, an officer from Cheatham's staff arrived to insist that Bate follow Cheatham's original orders and join Cleburne's attack. Late that night, Bate reported the contact with the Federal column, but Cheatham discounted the importance of the encounter.^[38] Back in Columbia, Schofield became convinced at about 3 p.m. that the Confederates would not attack him there and he began marching his men to Spring Hill. As soon as the initial units departed, Stephen D. Lee coincidentally began an attack against the Union position. By the time the bulk of his two divisions were able to cross, the senior Union commander left behind at Columbia, Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, began his withdrawal and the final troops departed up the Franklin Pike by 10 p.m.^[39]

Cleburne's 3,000 men began an attack against Bradley's brigade at about 4 p.m. Whereas Cheatham was expecting Cleburne to drive north into Spring Hill, Hood's intention was to use this formation to sweep toward the turnpike and wheel left to intercept Schofield's arriving units. Cleburne wheeled his brigades into a northern alignment against Bradley's right flank, causing Bradley and his men to flee in disorder. Cleburne's two brigades chased them vigorously, and they were stopped short of the turnpike only by heavy fire from the IV Corps

By this time, Cheatham's division under Maj. Gen. John C. Brown was moved into position for another attack on Spring Hill, on Cleburne's right. Brown did not attack, however. It was reported that there were Union troops in position on his right flank and front and that Forrest's cavalrymen, promised to protect his right flank, did not seem to be present. Brown decided to consult with his corps commander before proceeding, sending two staff officers to find Cheatham and halting his troops while he awaited a decision. By the time Cheatham and Brown were able to speak, the battlefield was in total darkness, and the two officers decided that an assault conducted then without knowing the condition of their right flank might be a disaster. Hood was furious that the attack had not proceeded as he intended and that the pike was still open. He dispatched a staff officer to find Stewart to assist Cheatham. Having been up since 3 a.m., Hood went to bed at 9 p.m., confident that whatever setbacks his army had suffered during the day, they would be able to correct them in the morning and bag Schofield.[4]

The Battle of Spring Hill was a minor affair in terms of casualties—about 350 Union and 500 Confederate—but the result of miscommunication and simply bad military management was that during the night all of Schofield's command, including Cox, passed from Columbia through Spring Hill while the Confederate commanders slept. The passage of the army did not go unnoticed by some of the sol-diers, but no concerted effort was made to block the pike. Confederate cavalry attempted to block the passage of the supply trains north of Spring Hill, at Thompson's Station, but accompanying Federal infantry drove them off. A private soldier woke up the commanding general at 2 a.m. and reported he saw the Union column moving north, but Hood did nothing beyond sending a dispatch to

Cheatham to fire on passing traffic. [42] By 6:00 a.m. on November 30, all of Schofield's army was well north of Spring Hill and its vanguard had reached Franklin, where it began to build breastworks south of town. In the morning Hood discovered Schofield's escape, and after an angry conference with his subordinate commanders in which he blamed all but himself for the failure, ordered his army to resume its pursuit. Spring Hill had been, arguably, Hood's best chance to isolate and defeat the Union army and recriminations for the lost opportunity soon began flying. Hood believed that Cheatham was most responsible. Historians Thomas L. Connelly, Eric Jacobson, and Wiley Sword have each assigned blame to both Hood and Cheatham. [43]

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
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Šchofield's advance guard arrived in Franklin at about 4:30 a.m. on November 30. Jacob Cox, a division commander temporarily commanding the XXIII Corps, immediately began preparing strong defensive positions around the deteriorated entrenchments originally constructed for a previous engagement in 1863. Schofield decided to defend at Franklin with his back to the river because he had no pontoon bridges available that would enable his men to cross the river. Schofield needed time to repair the permanent bridges spanning the river, but by mid-afternoon, nearly all the supply wagons were across the Harpeth and on the road to Nashville. By



noon the Union works formed an approximate semicircle around the town. A gap in the line occurred where the Columbia Pike entered the outskirts of the town, left open to allow passage of the wagons. Just behind the center of the formidable line stood the Carter House, appropriated as Cox's headquarters. Two Union brigades from Wagner's division were positioned about a half mile forward of the main line. Wagner, perhaps misunderstanding his orders, ordered his three brigades to stop halfway to the Union line and dig in as best they could on the flat ground. Col. Emerson Opdycke considered Wagner's order to be ridiculous and réfused to obey it; he marched his brigadé through the Union line and into a reserve position behind the gap through which the Columbia Pike passed, leaving the brigades of Cols. John Q. Lane, and Joseph Conrad in front.^[44]

Hood's army began to arrive on Winstead Hill, two miles (3 km) south of Franklin, around 1 p.m. Hood ordered a frontal assault in the dwindling afternoon light—sunset would be at 4:34 p.m. that day—against the Union force, a decision that caused dismay among his top generals. Some popular histories assert that Hood acted rashly in a fit of rage, resentful that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill and that he wanted to discipline his army by ordering them to assault against strong odds. Recent scholarship by Eric Jacobson discounts this as unlikely, as it was not only militarily foolish, but Hood was observed to be determined, not angry, by the time he arrived in Franklin.^[45]

Regardless of Hood's personal motivations, his specific objective was to try to crush Schofield before he and his troops could escape to Nashville. The Confederates began moving forward at 4 p.m., with Cheatham's corps on the left of the assault and Stewart's on the right. Lee's corps, and almost all of the army's artillery, had not yet arrived from Columbia. Hood's attacking force, about 19-20,000 men, was arguably understrength for the mission he assigned—traversing two miles of open ground with only two batteries of artillery support and

then assaulting prepared fortifications. [46]
Hood's attack initially enveloped the 3,000 men in the two brigades under Lane and Conrad, which attempted to stand their ground behind inadequate fieldworks and without anchored flanks, but quickly collapsed under the pressure. Many of the veteran soldiers of the two brigades stampeded back on the Columbia Pike to the main breastworks, while some untried replacements were reluctant to move under fire and were captured. The fleeing troops were closely pursued by the Confederates and the two sides became so intermingled that defenders in the breastworks had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their comrades. [47]

The Union's momentary inability to defend the opening in the works caused a weak spot in its line at the Columbia Pike from the Carter House to the cotton gin. The Confederate divisions of Cleburne, Brown, and French converged on this front and a number of their troops broke through the now not-so-solid Federal defenses on either side. In a matter of minutes, the Confederates had penetrated 50 yards through the center of the Federal line.^[48]

As the Confederates began their attack, Opdycke's brigade was in reserve. He quickly positioned his men into line of battle and ordered his brigade forward to the works. Hand-to-hand fighting around the Carter House and the pike was furious and desperate. Firing continued around the Carter house and gardens for hours. Many Confederates were driven back to the Federal earthworks, where many were pinned down for the remainder of the evening, unable to either advance or flee. Brown's division suffered significant losses, including Brown, who was wounded, and all four of his brigade commanders were casualties. Brown's brigade attack near the cotton gin was driven back from the

breastworks and was then subjected to devastating cross fire from Reilly's brigade to their front and the brigade of Col. John S. Casement, on Reilly's right. Cleburne was killed in the attack and 14 of his brigade and regimental commanders were casualties.^[49]

While fighting raged at the center of the Union line, Stewart's Corps also advanced against the Union left. Because the Harpeth River flowed in that area from southeast to northwest, the brigade found themselves moving through a space getting progressively narrower, squeezing brigades together into a compressed front, delaying their movements and reducing their unit cohesion. They were all subjected to fierce artillery fire not only from the main Union line, but also from the batteries across the river at Fort Granger. And they had signifi-

cant difficulty pushing through the strong Osage-orange abatis. [50]

Loring's division launched two attacks against the Union brigade of Col. Israel N. Stiles and both were repulsed with heavy losses. Artillery firing canister rounds directly down the railroad cut prevented any attempt to flank the Union position. Brig. Gen. John Adams attempted to rally his brigade by galloping his horse directly onto the earthworks, but he and his horse were both shot and killed. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston began falling back under heavy fire when its division commander, Maj. Gen. William W. Loring, confronted them, shouting, "Great God! Do I command cowards?" He attempted to inspire his men by sitting on his horse in full view of the Federal lines for over a minute and amazingly emerged unharmed, but the brigade made no further progress. Walthall's division struck Casement's and Reilly's brigades in multiple waves of brigade assaults—probably as many as six distinct attacks. All of these assaults were turned back with heavy losses.^[51]

Maj. Gen. William B. Bate's division attacked on the Union right flank. His left flank was not being protected as he expected by Chalmers's cavalry division, and they received enfilade fire. To protect the flank, Bate ordered the Florida Brigade to move from its reserve position to his left flank. This not only delayed the advance, but provided only a single line to attack the Union fortifications, leaving no reserve. Chalmers's troopers had actually engaged the Federal right by this time, fighting dismounted, but Bate was unaware of it because the two forces were separated by rolling ground and orchards. Neither Bate nor Chalmers made any progress and they withdrew. Hood was still convinced that he could pierce the Federal line. At about 7 p.m., he deployed the only division of Stephen D. Lee's corps that had arrived, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson, to assist Cheatham's effort. They were repulsed after a single assault with

heavy losses [52]

In addition to Chalmers's actions in the west, across the river to the east Confederate cavalry commander Forrest attempted to turn the Union left. Union cavalry commander Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson learned at 3 p.m. that Forrest was crossing the river, he ordered his division under Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch to move south from his position on the Brentwood Turnpike and attack Forrest from the front. He ordered Brig. Gen. John T. Croxton's brigade to move against Forrest's flank and held Col. Thomas J. Harrison's brigade in reserve. The dismounted cavalrymen of Hatch's division charged the Confederate cavalrymen, also dismounted, and drove them back across the river. [53]


Following the failure of Johnson's assault, Hood decided to end offensive actions for the evening and began to plan for a resumed series of attacks in the morning. Schofield ordered his infantry to cross the river, starting at 11 p.m. Although there was a period in which the Union army was vulnerable, outside its works and straddling the river, Hood did not attempt to take advantage of it during the night. The Union army began entering the breastworks at Nashville at noon on December 1, with Hood's damaged army in pursuit.^[54]
The devastated Confederate force was left in control of Franklin, but its enemy had escaped again. Although he had briefly come close

to breaking through in the vicinity of the Columbia Turnpike, Hood was unable to destroy Schofield or prevent his withdrawal to link up with Thomas in Nashville. And his unsuccessful result came with a frightful cost. The Confederates suffered 6,252 casualties, including 1,750 killed and 3,800 wounded. An estimated 2,000 others suffered less serious wounds and returned to duty before the Battle of Nashville. But more importantly, the military leadership in the West was decimated, including the loss of perhaps the best division commander of either side, Patrick Cleburne. Fourteen Confederate generals (six killed or mortally wounded, seven wounded, and one captured) and 55 regimental commanders were casualties. [55]

Union losses were reported as only 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 missing. It is possible that the number of casualties was under-reported by Schofield because of the confusion during his army's hasty nighttime evacuation of Franklin. [56] The Union wounded

were left behind in Franklin.

The Army of Tennessee was all but destroyed at Franklin. Nevertheless, rather than retreat and risk the army dissolving through desertions, Hood advanced his 26,500 man force against the Union army now combined under Thomas, firmly entrenched at Nashville. This was a controversial move on Hood's part because his army was enervated and no longer ready for offensive operations. However, he believed that if he ordered a retreat, it would mean the complete disintegration of his army. Hood decided that destruction of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad and disruption of the Union army supply depot at Murfreesboro would help his cause. On December 4 he sent Forrest, with two cavalry divisions and Maj. Gen. William B. Bate's infantry division, to Murfreesboro. Hood or dered Bate to destroy the railroad and blockhouses between Murfreesbol Θ and Nashville and join Forrest for further operations. $^{
m I}$



Forrest's combined command attacked Murfreesboro but was repulsed. They destroyed railroad track, blockhouses, and some homes and generally disrupted Union operations in the area, but they did not accomplish much else. The raid on Murfreesboro was a minor irritation. Bate was recalled to Nashville, but Forrest remained near Murfreesboro and thus was absent from the battle of Nashville. In retrospect, Hood's decision to detach Forrest from his main command was a major blunder. [58]

Under the command of Thomas, who now had a combined force of approximately 55,000 men, the 7-mile-long semicircular Union defensive line surrounded Nashville from the west to the east; the remainder of the circle, to the north, was the Cumberland River, patrolled by U.S. Navy gunboats.^[59]

It took Thomas over two weeks to move, causing great anxiety in Washington, where it was anticipated that Hood was poised for an invasion of the North. General Grant pressured Thomas to move, despite a bitter ice storm that struck on December 8 and stopped much fortification on both sides. A few days later, Grant sent an aide to relieve Thomas of command, believing that Hood would slip through his fingers. On December 13, Maj. Gen. John A. Logan was directed to proceed to Nashville and assume command if, upon his arrival, Thomas had not yet initiated operations. He made it as far as Louisville by December 15, but on that day the Battle of Nashville had finally begun. [60]

Thomas finally came out of his fortifications on December 15 to start a two-phase attack on the Confederates. The first, but secondary, attack was by Steedman on the Confederate right flank. The main attack would be on the enemy's left, by Smith, Wood, and Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch (commanding a dismounted cavalry brigade). Steedman's attack kept Cheatham on the Confederate right occupied for the rest of the day. The main attack wheeled left to a line parallel to the Hillsboro Pike. By noon, the main advance had reached the pike, and Wood prepared to assault the Confederate outposts on Montgomery Hill, near the center of the line. Hood became concerned about the threat on his left flank and ordered Lee to

NASHVILLE Cumberland Steedman THOMAS STEWART WOOD Steedman

and Wilson. By 1:30 p.m., Stewart's position along the pike became untenable; the attacking force was overwhelming. Stewart's corps broke and began to retreat toward the Granny White Turnpike. However, Hood was able to regroup his men toward nightfall in preparation for the battle the next day. The Union cavalry under Wilson had been unable to put enough force on the turnpike to hamper the Confederate movement, since many of its troopers were participating as dismounted infantry in the assault. The exhausted Confederates dug in all night, awaiting the arrival of the Federals. [62]

It took most of the morning on December 16 for the Federals to move into position against Hood's new line, which had been reduced to about 2 miles in length. Once again, Thomas planned a two-phase attack but concentrated on Hood's left. Schofield was to drive back Cheatham, and Wilson's cavalry was to swing to the rear to block the Franklin Pike, Hood's only remaining route of withdrawal. At noon, Wood and Steedman attacked Lee on Overton's Hill, but without success. On the left, Wilson's dismounted cavalry was exerting pressure on the line.

At 4 p.m., Cheatham, on Shy's Hill, was under assault from three sides, and his corps broke and fled to the rear. Wood took this opportunity to renew his attack on Lee on Overton's Hill, and this time the momentum was overwhelming. Darkness fell, and heavy rain began. Hood collected his forces and withdrew to the south toward Franklin. [64]

Casualties from the two-day battle were 3,061 Union (387 killed, 2,558 wounded, and 112 missing or captured) and approximately 6,000 Confederate (1,500 killed or wounded, 4,500 missing or captured). The Battle of Nashville was one of the most stunning victories achieved by the Union Army in the war. The formidable Army of Tennessee, the second largest Confederate force, was effectively destroyed as a fighting force. Hood's army entered Tennessee with over 30,000 men but left with 15–20,000. [66]

The Union army set off in pursuit of Hood from Nashville. The rainy weather became an ally to the Confederates, delaying the Union cavalry pursuit, and Forrest was able to rejoin Hood on December 18, screening the retreating force. The pursuit continued until the beaten and battered Army of Tennessee recrossed the Tennessee River on December 25. On Christmas Eve, Forrest turned back Wilson's pursuing cavalry at the Battle of Anthony's Hill. [67]

Although Hood blamed the entire debacle of his campaign on his subordinates and the soldiers themselves, his career was over. He retreated with his army to Tupelo, Mississippi, resigned his command on January 13, 1865, and was not given another field command. Forrest returned to Mississippi, but in 1865 he was driven into Alabama by James H. Wilson, and his command became dissipated and ineffective. [68]

By the time of Hood's defeat in Nashville, Sherman's army had advanced to the outskirts of Savannah, which they captured just before Christmas. Five thousand men from the Army of Tennessee were later deployed under Joseph E. Johnston against Sherman in South Carolina during the Carolinas Campaign, but to no avail.

End Notes

- $1.\,$ Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 45, chapter 57, part 1, page 53
- 2. Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 45, chapter 57, part 1, page 54
- $3.\,$ Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 45, chapter 57, part 1, page 55
- 4. Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 45, chapter 57, part 1, page 663
- $\mathsf{5.}\,$ Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 45, chapter 57, part 1, page 663
- 6. Welcher, vol. II, p. 583.
- /. Esposito, text for map 148; Connelly, pp. 477-78; Eicher, pp. 736-37; Jacobson, pp. 29-30; Sword, pp. 45-46.
- 8. Connelly, pp. 472-77; Sword, pp. 46-49; Jacobson, pp. 30-32.
- 9. Welcher, p. 583; Esposito, map 148.
- 10.Sword, pp. 51-52; Kennedy, p. 389. Connelly, p. 479, discounts the specific nature of Davis's rhetoric and states that there is "little in Davis's several messages to indicate that any plan was in the making for leaving Sherman behind and invading Tennessee and the Ohio Valley. ... such comments had been made often by Confederate leaders attempting to whip up the western morale.
- 11.Eicher, p. 769. At the start of the Atlanta Campaign, Hood was appointed a temporary "full" $\frac{1}{2}$ confirmed by the Confederate Congress and was later rescinded.
- **12.**Eicher, p. 769.
- 13.Eicher, p. 770. Although Thomas and Schofield were the commanders of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, respectively, through 1865, historians of the campaign do not always use these designations for the combination of corps assembled against Hood, referring in some cases only to the "Federal Army." See, for example, Welcher, vol. II, pp. 599, 611; Sword, p. 448; Jacobson, p. 452.
- 14.Welcher, p. 583; Esposito, maps 148, 149. Sword, p. 84, states that the best horses were reserved by Sherman for his March to the Sea.
- 15.Sword, p. 54; Esposito, map 149; Welcher, p. 583.
- 16. Welcher, p. 584; Kennedy, p. 390.
- 17.Welcher, p. 584; Kennedy, p. 391; Sword, p. 56; Eicher, p. 738.
- 18.Jacobson, p. 38; Sword, p. 56; Eicher, pp. 738-39; Nevin, p. 29.
- **19.** Sword, pp. 56-57; Jacobson, pp. 38-39; Kennedy, p. 391.
- 20.Esposito, map 150; Sword, pp. 58-62; Kennedy, p. 391; Nevin, p. 32; Jacobson, p. 41.
- 21.Esposito, map 150; Connelly, p. 483; Sword, pp. 63-64; Nevin, pp. 32-33; Eicher, p. 769; Jacobson, pp. 42-43.
- 22. Esposito, map 150; Jacobson, pp. 38-39, 48; Welcher, pp. 584-85; Nevin, p. 34; Kennedy, p. 391.
- 23. Wills, pp. 263-69.
- 24. Wills, pp. 268-73; Kennedy, p. 389.
- 25.Wills, pp. 272-73; Sword, pp. 67-68; Nevin, p. 34; Eicher, p. 769; Kennedy, p. 389.
- **26.**Kennedy, p. 392; Jacobson, p. 43; Sword, pp. 64-65.
- 27. Sword, pp. 68-70, 74; McPherson, p. 180.
- 28.Sword, pp. 72-73, 81-82, 85; Jacobson, pp. 44-47, 51, 58; Nevin, pp. 82-84.
- 29. Connelly, p. 492.
- 30.Sword, pp. 84, 89, 91; Nevin, pp. 82-83; Jacobson, pp. 53, 55; Welcher, p. 586; McPherson, p. 180.
- 31.Official Records of the War of the Rebellion 45, pt.1, 550, 752, 768
- 32.Jacobson, pp. 59-61, 64-65; Sword, pp. 91, 93-95; Nevin, p. 85; McPherson, p. 180; Welcher, pp. 586-87; Kennedy, p. 392.
- 33.Sword, pp. 93-95; McPherson, pp. 181-82; Eicher, p. 770.
- **34.** McPherson, p. 182; Welcher, p. 588; Nevin, p. 88.
- 35.Jacobson, pp. 72-75; Eicher, p. 770; McPherson, p. 182; Welcher, p. 588; Nevin, p. 88.
- 36. Jacobson, pp. 72-75; Eicher, p. 770; McPherson, p. 182; Welcher, p. 588; Nevin, p. 88. Connelly, pp. 491-92, concludes that Hood's actual plan was to outrace Schofield to Nashville, not intercept him.
- 37.Jacobson, pp. 72-75, 88-96; McPherson, pp. 182-83; Welcher, pp. 588-89; Nevin, p. 89.
- **38.** McPherson, p. 183; Connelly, p. 496; Jacobson, pp. 102, 122-24; Welcher, pp. 589-90; Sword, pp. 136-37.
- 39.Sword, pp. 140-44; Jacobson, pp. 102-03, 137-38; Welcher, pp. 590-91; Nevin, p. 93.
- 40.Jacobson, pp. 105-15; Sword, pp. 126-31; Kennedy, p. 394; Nevin, p. 92; McPherson, p. 183; Connelly, pp. 495-96.
- 41.Jacobson pp. 130-36; Connelly, pp. 497-500; Sword, pp. 135-39; Nevin, p. 93; Welcher, p. 590; McPherson, pp. 183-84.
- 42. Sword, pp. 152-55; Connelly, p. 500; Nevin, pp. 95-96; McPherson, p. 185; Eicher, p. 771.
- 43. Connelly, p. 501; Sword, pp. 152-55; Kennedy, p. 395; Jacobson, pp. 173-79.
- 44.Eicher, p. 772; Sword, pp. 159-60, 167, 171-77; Jacobson, pp. 198-203, 208-12, 219-21, 228, 230; Welcher, pp. 590-94.
- 45.Jacobson, pp. 239-42. For examples of the popular view promoting Hood's anger and resentment, see Sword, p. 179, McPherson, pp. 188-89, and Niven, pp. 95-96.
- 46. Welcher, p. 595; Sword, p. 180; Jacobson, pp. 243-47; McPherson, p. 189.


- 47. Nevin, p. 103; Jacobson, pp. 259-60, 273-74, 278-82; Sword, pp. 189-96; McPherson, pp. 189-91. 48. Welcher, p. 595; Nevin, p. 105; Jacobson, pp. 259-60, 273-74, 278-82; Sword, pp. 194-96; McPherson, p. 191. 49. Sword, pp. 199-206, 221-24; Jacobson, pp. 308, 315, 319-34, 286; Nevin, pp. 112-15; Welcher, pp. 595-96. 50. Welcher, pp. 596-97; Sword, p. 292; Jacobson, pp. 244, 262, 285. 51. Jacobson, pp. 292-93, 299-305, 339-43; Sword, pp. 216-19, 226-27; Welcher, p. 597; Niven, pp. 114-15.

- 52. Jacobson, pp. 356-58, 377-85; Sword, pp. 238-42, 245-47. 53. Jacobson, pp. 358-61; Niven, p. 117; Sword, p. 241; Welcher, p. 598. 54. Niven, pp. 117-18; Sword, pp. 243, 248-51.
- 55. Jacobson, pp. 418-20. Jacobson presents a full list of all of the officers who were casualties during the battle.
- 56. Current unpublished research by Carter House historian David Fraley has identified Union killed at Franklin to be in excess of 600 and perhaps as many as 800. However, this list may include men who had fought at Franklin and died in captivity or in the Sultana explosion in April 1865.
- 57. Sword, pp. 293-95; McPherson, p. 195; Niven, pp. 125-26; Kennedy, p. 396.

- 59. Welcher, p. 600; Sword, p. 449; Eicher, pp. 775-76.
 60. Kennedy, p. 397; Sword, p. 312; Welcher, p. 602; Eicher, p. 776; Esposito, map 153.
 61. Niven, p. 126; McPherson, pp. 196-97; Welcher, pp. 602-05; Sword, pp. 321-29; Eicher, pp. 776-77;
 62. McPherson, pp. 197-203; Welcher, pp. 605-08; Sword, pp. 331-44; Niven, pp. 130-33; Esposito, map 153; Eicher, p. 777; Kennedy, p.
- 63. Sword, pp. 348-65; McPherson, pp. 203-05; Welcher, pp. 608-09; Esposito, map 154; Eicher, p. 779; Niven, pp. 134-37. 64. McPherson, pp. 205-07; Niven, pp. 137-44; Sword, pp. 369-80; Welcher, pp. 609-10; Eicher, p. 779; Kennedy, p. 397.
- 65. Eicher, p. 780.
- 66. Jacobson, p. 428: the field returns for Hood's army on January 20, 1865, listed 20,700 effectives. Jacobson surmises that missing men from Franklin and Nashville gradually rejoined the army during and after its retreat.
- 67. Welcher, p. 610; McPherson, pp. 207-08.
- 68. Esposito, map 153; Niven, p. 144; Kennedy, p. 397.

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Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant became commander of all federal forces in the region of Mississippi and east Louisiana in October 1862. For the next nine months, he fought for control of Vicksburg and the Mississippi River, and the Mississippi Central Railroad Campaign was the first in a series of attempts to capture the Confederate citadel. It would end in failure because of a daring raid at Holly Springs, Mississippi, made by Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn. Larry Allen McCluney Jr. examines the campaign as Grant followed the railroad through the Mississippi towns of Holly Springs, Abbeville, Water Valley, Oxford, Coffeeville, and the outskirts of Grenada where his advance was halted, forcing him to return to Holly Springs after Van Dorn's raid. The book addresses a too-little examined phase of Grant's greater Vicksburg Campaign: His initial intent to take the "Gibraltar of the Mississippi" by going through Jackson, Mississippi, on the Mississippi Central Railroad.

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UNITED CONFEDERATE VETERANS, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, APRIL 25, 1906.